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THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU*

Extradition and Transnational
Terrorism: A Comment on the
Recent Extradition of Klaus Croissant
from France to West Germany
On September 30, 1977, the Paris police arrested Klaus Croissant, a West
German national and a former attorney for members of the Baader-Meinhof
gang. I In West Germany, Croissant had long been suspected of acting as an information link between his imprisoned clients and their compatriots at
liberty.2 Before Croissant entered France, West German authorities had
charged him with aiding a criminal group. Pending trial, he was released on
bail; but on July 10 he left Germany and sought refuge in France.' On July 11,
Croissant, acting through his lawyers, requested political asylum in France,
alleging that it was impossible for him to continue to exercise his profession in
West Germany.'
During the negotiations that ensued between Croissant's lawyers and the
French Ministry of Justice (i.e., from July 11 to September 29), the French
police were unable to locate his whereabouts.' However, leading French journalists did manage to interview him. These interviews culminated in a news
conference on August 27 in which the former attorney denounced the West
6
German treatment of "political" prisoners.
On July 15, the Stuttgart court issued an international warrant for Croissant's arrest, charging, inter alia, that he had aided a criminal group and
propagandized on its behalf.7 The warrant referred to events that occurred between 1975 and 1976.' On July 19, the West German Government, pursuant to
*Associate, S.G. Archibald (Paris, France) (on leave); Jervey Fellow, Parker School of Foreign
& Comparative Law Columbia University School of Law
Le Monde, Oct. 2-3, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
2
1d.
'Id.
'Id.
'Id.
61d.
71d.
1Id. Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5.
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the provisions of its extradition convention with France, requested Croissant's
extradition on the basis of the charges contained in the Stuttgart warrant.' On
September 30, the Federal Tribunal in Karlsruhe issued a second international
warrant for Croissant's arrest which implicated him more directly in more recent terrorist incidents: according to the warrant, Croissant had been in direct

contact with persons who participated in the assassination of Jurgen Ponto,
President of Dresdner Bank, and the kidnapping of Hans Martin Schleyer, a
prominent West German businessman.'" On October 1, the West German
Government made a second request for Croissant's extradition on the basis of
the Karlsruhe warrant."
On October 3, the chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel of Paris convened to consider the West German requests." These proceedings, however,
were characterized by extensive procedural formalities and were
inconclusive.' 3 Since the second extradition request had been received only a
few days before the court convened, Croissant's lawyers requested a postponement in order to study the new documents.II The court granted the motion and
set October 10th as the date for a proceeding on the merits.'"
Judicial action on the merits was delayed several times thereafter owing to
the difficulty of translating the numerous West German documents."' Finally,
on November 16, the court rendered a "partially favorable" decision, granting
the extradition request for only one of the charges contained in the Stuttgart
arrest warrant." Croissant's extradition could be granted, ruled the court,
"for [his] having, as a lawyer, contributed to organizing and operating an information system between imprisoned terrorists and others in liberty by
transmitting correspondence, instructions and documents favoring, as a consequence, their activities.""

'Id.
Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
"Id. Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5.
"Id. Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
'Id. Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5.
13Id.
141d.
I1d.
'Id. Oct. 12, 1977, at 21, col. 1;id. Oct. 14, 1977, at 13, col. 1;id. Nov. 9, 1977, at 15, col. 6.
"Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3.
"Id. The official text of the decision has not been reported as yet in any of the French law journals. A report of the decision, however, should be forthcoming in the fall in 105 J. DR.
INT'L-CLUNET (1978). For the present analysis, the writer has relied upon the quoted excerpts of the
decision that appeared in French newspapers, most notably Le Monde and Le Figaro. The accuracy of these excerpts were verified by comparing the substance of various accounts against one
another.
For an account of the precipitous action of the French Government after the decision was
rendered, see Le Figaro, Nov. 21, 1977, at 10, col. 1; Le Monde, Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
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Extradition" has been defined as "the act by which one nation delivers up
an individual, accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory,
to another nation which demands him and which is competent to try and
punish him."2 0 In contemporary international practice, the decision as to
whether an alleged offender will be extradited to the requesting State is within
the complete discretion of the requested State. Absent bilateral or multilateral
treaty obligations, there is no legal duty to extradite. Where treaty provisions
govern, the requested State usually will grant an extradition request only for
crimes enumerated in the treaty. Moreover, most treaties provide an exception
for acts deemed to be "political offenses." In any event, extradition is
ultimately a political decision to be made by the government of the requested
2
State. '
In the context of transnational terrorism, the process of extradition takes on
special significance precisely because of the "political offense" exception and
the almost unlimited discretion of governments in matters of extradition. Most
terrorists will seek asylum in countries which are sympathetic to the political
beliefs which allegedly motivated their crimes. Such countries are likely to
refuse requests for the extradition of terrorists: either they are not parties to
extradition agreements and hence are not under a legal duty to extradite; or
22
they will invoke the "political offense" exception of existing treaties.
To recall a familiar example, on December 18, 1973, Arab terrorists attacked a Pan American jet airliner at the Rome airport. Thirty-two persons
were killed during the attack. In order to escape, the terrorists hijacked a
Lufthansa plane and flew to Athens, where they demanded the release of two
Palestinians imprisoned there. 3 Then they flew to Kuwait." Italy, Morocco,
West Germany, and the United States made requests for the extradition of the
terrorists, but Kuwait had no extradition treaty with any of these States.
Moreover, the Kuwaiti Government deemed the acts of the terrorists to be of a
"political" character. Ultimately, the terrorists were handed over to the
"Arab Liberation movement" for having committed "crimes against the
movement." 2"
"For this summary of contemporary international practice relating to extradition, the writer has
relied heavily upon a previous study. See Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of
Abu Daoud by French Authorities, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 495, 495-96, 497-98 (1977).

"I1J.B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 3 (1891). See also A.
BILLOT, TAITE DE L'EXTRADITION 1 (1874); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (4th rev. ed. 1968). See
generally F. PIGGor, EXTRADITION 5-16 (1910).

"See Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility For Injuries to A liens Occasioned by Terrorist Ac-

tivities, 26 AM. U. L. REV 300 (1977).
"See id. at 303.

"N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
"Ibid., Dec. 20, 1973, at 1. col. 1.
"Ibid., Dec. 23, 1973, at 3, col. 1. For an analysis of this incident, see Lillich & Paxman, supra
note 21, at 277, 302.
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Given the alleged purposes and motives of their acts, terrorists apprehended
in less politically sympathetic countries also may invoke the "political
offense" exception. Recently, however, the courts in several countries have
held that terrorist crimes are outside the purview of the "political offense" exception.21 They have done so by adopting a restrictive and narrow construction
of political crimes. In Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong,2" the United
States requested the extradition of Armstrong from Canada on charges
relating to the bombing of four buildings at the University of Wisconsin in
1972. In contesting the request for his extradition, Armstrong alleged that his
acts were of a "political character," since they were directed against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The extradition magistrate, however, ruled
that the "political offense" exception was inapplicable since no classified
research had been done on the campus and the accused was not part of an
organized political protest movement. The magistrate also noted that the acts
of the accused were directed at the property of the university, not at the U.S.
Government. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, which
characterized Armstrong as "not a political fugitive but simply a fugitive from
justice . .."I'
Cheng v. Governor of PentonvillePrison" involved a Formosan who fled to
Sweden after having been convicted of the attempted murder of Chiang Kaishek's son in New York City. The Swedish Government, after some hesitation,
acceded to the U.S. request for his extradition, but, while Cheng was being
flown back to the United States, he became ill and was taken to London for
medical treatment. The United States then had to request his extradition from
Great Britain. In the proceedings before the British court, Cheng contended
that the request should be denied because his acts fell within the "political offense" provision of the extradition treaty between the United States and Great
Britain. The House of Lords, however, concluded that the exception applied
only to acts of political opposition to the State requesting extradition. Since
Cheng's act was not directed against the U.S. Government, the request for
Cheng's extradition was granted.
The most recent application of the "political offense" exception to incidents
of transnational terrorism is the case of Rolf Pohle, decided by the Supreme
Court of Greece in October 1976.1 o Pohle, a member of the Baader-Meinhof
terrorist gang, was sentenced by a West German court in 1974 to six years' im"Ibid., at 300-03.
1128 D.L.R.3d 513 (York, Ontario County Ct. 1972).
232 D.L.R.3d 265 (Fed. Ct. App. 1973). See Note, Asylum or Accessory: TheNon-Surrender of
Political Offenders by Canada, 31 U. TORONTO FACULTY L. REV. 93 (1973).
1[1973] A.C. 931 (H.L.).
"See Judgment of Oct. 1, 1976, Washington Post, Oct. 4, 1976, § A, at 24, col. 1 (S. Ct.
Greece).
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prisonment. He was freed the following year in exchange for a West Berlin
politician who had been kidnapped by other members of the gang. After his
arrest in Athens in 1976, the West German government sought his extradition
from Greece on the ground that his prison term in West Germany had not been
satisfied. 3' The court of appeals in Athens, apparently taking note, at least indirectly, of leftist political pressures,32 denied the request, holding that "his
acts were those of a genuine revolutionary, and that they were not a criminal
but a political offense."" This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Greece which adopted "a very narrow definition of a political crime, taking it
to cover only actions aiming directly at overthrowing the existing system, not
all those prompted by political ideas or motives." 3 '
Under French law," extradition is an act of mutual international assistance
in the repression of crimes and the punishment of criminal offenders.3 6 A request for extradition is a diplomatic act, involving the legal duties of the national government as they arise under public international law. 37 The final
decision on extradition rests with the executive branch. Although the executive
is under a legal obligation to consult with the judiciary, the role of the courts is
narrowly defined and subordinate to that of the executive.3"
In the absence of an applicable treaty provision, 3' the Law of March 10,
1927 is controlling in matters of extradition. In all cases, the Chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel decides whether the extradition request is in conformity with procedural requirements; the court's denial of the request on
substantive grounds is binding upon the executive.'" Otherwise, the executive
is free to grant or to deny the request on the basis of its own determination."
In the instant case, the West German extradition requests had been made in
full procedural conformity'" with the provisions of the French-German Ex"Loc. cit.
"Le Figaro, Nov. 18, 1977, at 12, col. 3.
"See Judgment of Oct. 1, 1976, note 30 supra.
"THE TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 1976, at 4, col. 1. See also THE ECONOMIST. Oct. 9, 1976, at 65,

col. 2.
"For this summary of the relevant French law, the writer has relied extensively upon a previous
study. See Note, supra note 19, at 503-04.
"See AYMOND, EXTRADITION, [II-Droit Penal] ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ ch. 1, § 1, 1 6 (1968).
"See ibid., ch. 1,§ 1, 4 & 2, 34.
"Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 14-17, [1927] J.O. 2877-79; [1927] 1GAz. PAL. 1020. See also Aymond, supra note 36, at ch. 1,§ 2, 36, 38, 40.

"Law of March 10, 1927, art. 1 [1927] J.O. 2874, [1927] 1 GAz. PAL. 1018. See also AYMOND,
supra note 36, at ch. 1,§ 2, 1 37, 38.
"Law of March 27, 1927, arts. 16-17, [1927] J.0. 2879, [19271 1GAZ. PAL. 1020. See also AyMOND, supra note 36, at ch. 1, § 2,
38.
"Law of March 10, 1927, art. 18, [1927] J.0. 2880, [19271 1 GAz. PAL. 1020. See also AYMOND,
supra note 36, at ch. 1,§ 2, 38.
"Convention on Extradition, Nov. 29, 1951, France-West Germany, [19591 J.0. 11524.
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tradition Convention." The question before the Cour d'appelwas whether the
charges contained in the arrest warrants constituted extraditable crimes under
French law."'
Although its outcome is rather unique by comparison, the Croissant deci-

sion fits into a line of recent French cases involving the extradition of alleged
transnational terrorists.' For example, in the earlier case of In re Holder &
Kerhow,"1 the U.S. Government requested the extradition from France of two
fugitive U.S. nationals who had hijacked a plane in 1972 on a flight from Los
Angeles to Seattle. The record showed that, during the incident, one of the
fugitives demanded that the aircraft be flown to Hanoi but later changed his

mind. He also made vague references to Angela Davis and Eldridge Cleaver
during the hijacking."'
On the basis of this evidence, despite U.S. contentions that hijacking was a

common crime especially when it resulted in the extortion of $500,000, the
Cour d'appel of Paris denied the extradition request, ruling that the crime was

a political offense." Reading between the lines of the opinion, one suspects
that the Cour d'appel tacitly incorporated the French Government's criticism

of U.S. policy in Vietnam into its assessment of the evidence.
In the Abu Daoud case,'

the influence of the executive branch upon a

theoretically independent judiciary was deemed, by many commentators, to be
manifest.5 0 Abu Daoud, an alleged organizer of the July 1972 Munich
Olympics massacre, entered France in January 1977 as part of an official
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation."

A few days later,

"Le Monde, Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
"Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3.
"For this summary of recent French cases, the writer has relied upon two previous studies. See
Note, supra note 19, at 495-513, 498; The Political Offense Exception to Extradition and Transnational Terrorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created, I AsiLs. INTL L.J. 1, 22,
43 (1977).
"Ct. of Appeals, Paris, Fr., E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRAcTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 168 (1975).
"Loc. cit.
"Loc. cit.
"104 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 843 (1977). See also Note, supra, note 19, at 495-513.
"See, e.g., Rubin, Abu Daoud Case: Floating World Law, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 27,
1977, at 31, col. 1; Note, The Abu Daoud Affair, 2 J. INT'LL& EcON. 539 (1977); Recent Development International Terrorism:Extradition, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467 (1977).
"The facts of the case were reported in the Agence France-Presse Interview with Raymond
Barre, Prime Minister of France, in Paris (Jan. 13, 1977) (transcript obtained from the Information Service of the French Embassy, Washington, D.C.) and the Communique of the French
Ministry of Justiced Concerning the Release of Abu Daoud (Jan. 11, 1977) (obtained from the Information Service of the French Embassy, Washington, D.C.). The Barre Interview was reported
in N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1977 § A, at 1, col. 4.
Other information was reported in news accounts. See The Economist, Jan. 15, 1977, at 43;
TIME, Jan. 24, 1977, at 29; The Guardian (London), Jan. 13, 1977, at 3, col. 1; Le Monde, Jan.
10, 1977, at 6, col. 1, Jan. 11, 1977, at 1,col. 3, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1, Jan. 13, 1977, § A,
at 2, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1; THE TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6,
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French police detained and then arrested him upon the request of the West
German and Israeli Governments. Officials of both governments announced
forthcoming requests for his extradition on charges relating to the Munich incident and other terrorist activities.' 2 On January 11, the Cour d'appel of Paris
convened in exceptional circumstances to rule upon the validity of Abu
Daoud's continued provisional detention pending the forthcoming West German and Israeli extradition requests." In a highly controversial opinion, the
court ruled that there were no legal grounds to justify Abu Daoud's continued
provisional detention in France." The extremely technical and legally dubious
character of the court's procedural holding and the circumstances in which the
case was considered led foreign officials and leading French newspapers to
decry the decision as having been politically motivated-a judicial confirmation of a foregone legal conclusion."
In the Croissant case, accusations of judicial subservience to executive
branch opinions and assessments of political exigencies cannot properly be
levied at the Cour d'appel. By all accounts, the court gave extensive consideration to all the relevant documents and allowed ample time to both sides to
prepare their case.'" Unlike Abu Daoud, Croissant did make a statement in
court denying the charges upon which the requests for his extradition were
based." Although the court refused to release him on bail, it provided convincing reasons for doing so."
The court's consideration of the merits of the case also reflected a high and
unimpeachable standard of judicial conduct. On the one hand, it held that the
charges contained in the Karlsruhe warrant constituted inadequate grounds for
extradition. According to the warrant, Croissant was suspected of having
aided the activities of members or sympathizers of the Haag-Meir gang or of
providing them with lodging in his law offices." The court declared that the
charge lacked a sufficient evidentiary base, stating that it had not been
col. 4, Jan. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 1, Mar. 19, 1977, at 5, col. 2.
For a very brief summary of the facts, see Roubache, A propos de Droit, 119771 51-53 GAZ. PAL.
See also 104 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 843 (1977).

"See Note, supra note 19, at 498-99; text at and accompanying note 51 supra.
"See Note, supra note 19, at 500; text at and accompanying note 51 supra.
"1104 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 844 (1977).
"See Note, supra note 19, at 501, 502-10.
"See, e.g., Le Monde, Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5; id. Oct 12, 1977, at 21, col. 1.
"See Le Monde, Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5. In his statement, Croissant described the charges
that were made against him as "defamation." He contended that he was not himself a political
militant, but rather their defender. He alluded to a number of his actions which showed his complete cooperation with French judicial authorities prior to his arrest. He further claimed that, after
the Schleyer kidnapping, the West German Government pressured its French counterpart to have
him arrested. For an account of the statement, see loc. cit.
"The court reasoned that Croissant's fleeing West Germany while he was free on bail set a bad
precedent. For an account of the opinion, see ibid., Oct. 14, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
"Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3.
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established that the persons to whom Croissant had rendered assistance
belonged to the terrorist group at the time of the terrorist incidents."' Under
French law, the accused could not be suspected of aiding a terrorist group on
that evidentiary basis alone.'
The charges contained in the Stuttgart warrant also came under close
scrutiny. The court refused to allow extradition based on the charge that
Croissant had aided a criminal group, the "Red Army" faction, by propagandizing, organizing press conferences and hunger strikes on their behalf. The
court ruled that, in French law, such crimes cannot be a ground for extradition."2 Indeed, the court rendered only a "partially favorable" decision, 63
granting the extradition request exclusively on the charge of "having, as a
lawyer, contributed to organizing and operating an information system between imprisoned terrorists and others in liberty by transmitting correspondence, instructions and documents favoring, as a consequence, their
activities. "64
The court's opinion represents a masterful piece of legal reasoning. By
resorting to an evidentiary justification and apparently to requirements laid
down by the French Extradition Statute,6 1 the court avoided drawing an explicit substantive distinction between alleged activities which have a political
6
character and those which are solely criminal from a legal point of view. For
example, the charge that Croissant had aided the "Red Army" faction,
characterized in the warrant as a "criminal group"-by propagandizing,
organizing press conferences and hunger strikes on their behalf-borders, by
any definition of the term, upon the political. To have considered the charge as
a serious ground for extradition, the court would have had to engage in the difficult, if not impossible, task of distinguishing criminal complicity with a terrorist group from genuine political acts.6 7 One of the possible implications of
such a holding might have been that, although they are associated with a terrorist group, non-violent acts taken solely as a result and in the furtherance of
political beliefs, are not crimes, in an a priori sense, but can, under certain circumstances, fall within the scope of the political offense exception to extradition. Such a holding would have gone far to refine current law dealing with the

"Loc.
"Loc.
"Loc.
"Loc.

cit.
cit.
cit.
cit.

"Loc. cit. See also text at note 18 supra.

of March 10, 1927, arts. 4 & 5, [1927] J.O. 2877, [1927] 1 GAZ. PALAIS 1020.
"For an extensive discussion of the political offense exception in the context of transnational
terrorism, see The Political Offense Exception To ExtraditionAnd Transnational Terrorists: Old
Doctrine Reformulated And New Norms Created, cited in note 45 supra.
"1See generally loc. cit.
6'Law
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applicability of the political offense exception to cases involving transnational
terrorists."8
Be that as it may, the court, nonetheless, granted the extradition request for
a charge which was distinctly more criminal in character and which was related
more closely to the perpetration of criminal acts. In so holding, the court took
the extradition request completely without consideration of the political
character of the act and relied, at least tacitly, upon the principle of specialty
in extradition law 9 to limit Croissant's forthcoming trial in West Germany to
purely criminal charges. Under the principle of speciality, the West German
authorities would be allowed to try Croissant only for the charge for which the
extradition request was granted, failing which a breach of international law
70
would have occurred.
Once the decision had been rendered and Croissant extradited, West German authorities demonstrated a willingness to comply with the court's ruling
and with their international obligations. Upon reaching West Germany, Croissant was afforded the right to choose his own attorneys; the President of the
Stuttgart court personally prescribed the conditions in which Croissant was to
be detained, thereby dispelling allegations of possible mistreatment and apprehension for his safety and security.7 Moreover, officials of the West German Ministry of Justice made public statements indicating that Croissant
would be tried only for the extraditable charge. He therefore faces a maximum
five, as opposed to ten, year prison sentence.2
West German officials and newspapers, of course, greeted the French court
decision with considerable enthusiasm, hailing it as a positive contribution to
the struggle of the international community against transnational terrorism."
Indeed, the West German Government had a number of reasons to be pleased
with the action of the French court. It ended Croissant's French-based public
relations campaign against West German domestic policies concerning
"political" prisoners. 7' The importance of the Croissant decision, however,
lies not in bringing legal sanctions to bear upon an isolated individual, but
rather in its value as a legal precedent. " The West German and other govern-

"Loc. cit.
"For a discussion of the principle of specialty, see 1. SHEARER,EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971).
'"See, e.g., ibid.; Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3.
"See Le Figaro, Nov. 18, 1977, at 12, col. 1. For an account of the appeals taken, see id. Nov.
17, 1977, at 17, col. 3; Le Monde, Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
"See Le Figaro, Nov. 18, 1977, at 12, col. 1.
7Loc. cit.
"Loc. cit.
"Loc. cit.
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ments now could point to a decision offsetting the opinion of the Greek court
of appeals in the Pohle case" and lending support to Helmut Schmidt's contention that "terrorists should be judged according to their acts, not their intentions."" Specifically, the Croissant decision would be invaluable in West
Germany's attempt to extradite one Wackernagel, allegedly one of the
Schleyer kidnappers, who had been arrested on November 10 in Holland."
Unquestionably, the French court's decision was exemplary from a doctrinal and procedural point of view-being not only lucidly reasoned but
rendered in full impartiality. It affords a welcome contrast to previous French
decisions" in this area and buttresses French support for efforts aimed at
thwarting the activities of terrorist groups. There is, however, one aspect of
the case which should be noted, but which was outside the scrutiny of the
court, and gave rise to numerous commentaries and an extensive debate.
On September 22, the West German Parliament passed a law which became
effective on October 2 permitting West German judicial authorities to prohibit
contacts betwen imprisoned terrorists and their legal counsel for a period of
thirty days.'" Obviously, its purpose is to prevent the passing of information
between imprisoned terrorists and their compatriots in liberty during and after
terrorist incidents. Many French lawyers, however, deemed the law to be
singular repressive-a flagrant violation of fundamental individual rights." In
fact, during the Croissant proceeding, a representative of the French bar made
a statement before the Cour d'appel declaring that, in the opinion of the bar,
le droit de la defense (the right to legal representation) itself was on trial as the
result of the recent West German law.' 2
The serious misgivings of the French bar should serve as a warning to all
democratic States seeking to devise effective measures to thwart the activities
of terrorist groups, that their legislative inventiveness and the need to respond
to urgent problems should not lead them to undermine their political
legitimacy. As the holding in Croissant makes plain, lawyers who engage in
criminal activities should be dealt with according to the traditional precepts of

"See text at notes 30-34 supra.
"Loc. cit.
"Loc. cit. The action on the extradition of Wackernagel from Holland was delayed somewhat

because the alleged kidnapper was seriously wounded in a gun battle with police. Ibid., Nov. 25,
1977, at 13, col. 5.

"See text at notes 45-55 supra.
"See Le Monde, Oct. 2-3, 1977, at 7,col. 1.
"See, e.g., id. Oct. 14, 1977, at 13, col. 1;id. Oct. 15, 1977, at 16, col. 4; id. Nov. 15, 1977, at
15, col. 1.
"See ibid., Oct. 12, 1977, at 21, col. I (statement by Mr. Mario Stasi).
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the penal law. The drastic legislation adopted by the West German Parliament
represents an unnecesary and democratically impermissible flouting of basic
individual rights. No matter how inhumane and repugnant terrorist activities
may be, they should not push States to respond to illegal and criminal acts in
kind, thereby perverting their own political integrity. The French court decision in Croissant is an eloquent statement that such extraordinary action is unnecessary.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4

